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Stochastic Maps, Wealth Distribution in Random Asset Exchange Models and the
Marginal Utility of Relative Wealth
Sitabhra Sinha
The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, C. I. T. Campus, Taramani, Chennai - 600 113, India.
We look at how asset exchange models can be mapped to random iterated function systems (IFS) giving new insights into
the dynamics of wealth accumulation in such models. In particular, we focus on the “yard-sale” (winner gets a random fraction
of the poorer players wealth) and the “theft-and-fraud” (winner gets a random fraction of the loser’s wealth) asset exchange
models. Several special cases including 2-player and 3-player versions of these ‘games’ allow us to connect the results with
observed features in real economies, e.g., lock-in (positive feedback), etc. We then implement the realistic notion that a richer
agent is less likely to be aggressive when bargaining over a small amount with a poorer player. When this simple feature is
added to the yard-sale model, in addition to the accumulation of the total wealth by a single agent (“condensation”), we can
see exponential and power-law distributions of wealth. Simulation results suggest that the power-law distribution occurs at the
cross-over of the system from exponential phase to the condensate phase.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.45.Df, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a considerable amount of
work done in developing the statistical mechanics of eco-
nomic activities leading to wealth accumulation and dis-
tribution in society [1]. One of the simplest class of mod-
els which explore these mechanisms are the “asset ex-
change models” [2–7]. In analogy with the physics of
ideal gases, economic agents can be viewed as particles
which have random elastic collisions with each other, re-
sulting in wealth circulation throughout the system. One
reliable indicator of whether these models reflect eco-
nomic reality is to test whether they reproduce the ob-
served wealth distribution in various societies.
It has been known now for over a century that al-
most all human societies tend to exhibit the same type
of wealth distribution. If P (x) is the probability distribu-
tion for income or wealth x of individuals, then for large
x, it follows the so-called Pareto law:
P (x) ∼ x−(1+ν),
i.e., a power law distribution with the exponent ν be-
tween 1 and 2 [8], while for small x, an exponential dis-
tribution is observed [9,10].
Unfortunately, the simplest asset exchange models do
not show this distribution. The asymptotic states of
these models exhibit either an exponential phase, or even
more extremely, all the wealth condensing into the hands
of a single individual; power-law distributions, if seen at
all, turn out to be transient [2–5]. However, recent work
on the effects of introducing random saving propensities
in the asset exchange models, have shown asymptotic
power law distribution similar to those observed in reality
[6,7]. In this paper, we look at another possible modifi-
cation of the asset exchange model: the same amount of
money may have different relative values to a rich agent
and a poor agent. In other words, the relative importance
of making a net gain in a round of trading is dependent
on the relative wealths of the agents involved. By intro-
ducing this simple principle into the model, we observe
a wide range of distributions: from an exponential phase
to a condensate phase, with a power-law distribution ap-
pearing in the transition region between the two phases.
We consider a simple model of a closed economic sys-
tem where the total wealth (amount of money) available
for exchange, M , and the total number of agents, N ,
trading with each other, are fixed. Wealth is neither cre-
ated nor destroyed, but only change hands through trad-
ing between agents. Further, the system is observed only
at discrete time intervals t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... Each agent i
has some wealth xi(t) associated with it at some time
step t. Starting from an arbitrary initial distribution of
wealth (xi(0), i = 1, 2, 3, ....), during each time step two
randomly chosen agents i and j exchange a fraction of
their combined wealth. Each such transaction is obey-
ing the constraint that the combined wealth of the two
agents is conserved by the trade, and that neither of the
two has negative wealth after the trade (i.e., debt is not
allowed). In general, one of the players will gain and the
other player will lose as a result of the trade.
Different types of exchange models are defined based
on the choice of the fraction of wealth that will be ex-
changed in a trade. If the wealth exchanged is a fraction
of the wealth owned by the poorer of the two agents,
then the model (in accordance with the terminology in-
troduced in Ref. [1]) is the so-called “Yard-Sale” model
(YS), whereas if the exchanged amount is a fraction of the
losing agent’s wealth, it is the “Theft-and-Fraud” model
(TF) [1]. These names reflect the fact that usually (e.g.,
in a yard sale) the richer agent is unlikely to stake its
entire holdings in a trade with a poorer agent. The only
circumstances during which such an event is likely to oc-
cur is when the poorer agent is dishonest, and either the
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exchange itself, or the wealth of the poorer agent, is un-
known to the richer agent (corresponding to theft and
fraud respectively).
If we consider an arbitrarily chosen pair of agents (i,
j) who trade at a time step t resulting in a net gain of
wealth by agent i, then the change in their wealth as a
result of trading is:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆x; xj(t+ 1) = xj(t)−∆x, (1)
where, ∆x is the net wealth exchanged between the two
agents. In the YS model
∆x = α min(xi(t), xj(t)), (2)
while in the TF model
∆x = α xj(t) (agent j has lost), (3)
with α as a uniformly distributed random number in the
interval [0, 1]. Whether agent i or j will ‘win’ in a par-
ticular trading encounter is decided by the toss of a fair
coin, i.e., each has a probability 1/2 of making a net gain.
A possible variant, where, the two agents randomly redis-
tribute their total wealth can be seen as a manifestation
of the TF model.
In the next section, the asset exchange models are seen
as a class of random dynamical systems. This picture al-
lows us to understand in simple terms various features of
the distribution seen in the two models. Section 3 intro-
duces the concept of diminishing bargaining efficiency as
the wealth of an agent is increased. Results of 2-agent
and N -agent asset exchange models are given. Finally,
we conclude with a summary and discussion of possible
directions for future work.
II. ASSET EXCHANGE MODELS AS
STOCHASTIC IFS
If we consider α to be a constant in Eqs. (2) and
(3), then for N = 2, the asset exchange model (YS or
TF) is a system of two maps of the unit interval [0,1]
onto itself, with the system randomly switching between
the two maps. The map selected at a particular instant
depends upon which agent wins in that particular trad-
ing round. Such stochastic dynamical systems are called
Iterated Function Systems (IFS) [11]. The 2 map IFS
corresponding to the YS and TF models are shown in
Fig. 1 for α = 0.5.
A. 2-agent models
Let us consider the YS model with N = 2, and total
wealthM = ΣNi=1x =1 (i.e., normalized). Then, the state
of such an economy at any given time t, is completely
specified by the wealth of any one of the agents, x(t)
(since the other agent’s wealth is 1− x(t)). For constant
α, the corresponding IFS is given by
Map 1 : x(t+ 1) = (1 + α) x(t), if x(t) < 0.5, (4)
= x(t) + α(1 − x(t)), otherwise,
and,
Map 2 : x(t+ 1) = (1− α) x(t), if x(t) < 0.5, (5)
= x(t) − α(1 − x(t)), otherwise.
For α = 0, the initial distribution is unchanged by the
IFS, but for any α > 0, the final distribution corresponds
to two delta function peaks at x = 0 and x = 1. In other
words, the entire wealth eventually ends up in the hands
of one of the two agents through a process of gradual
wealth condensation. The transition to this condensate
phase from an arbitrary initial distribution takes longer
and longer time as α → 0, in a process analogous to
critical slowing down.
In the TF model with N = 2, the wealth dynamics is
given by the IFS:
Map 1 : x(t+ 1) = (1− α) x(t) + α, (6)
and,
Map 2 : x(t+ 1) = (1− α) x(t). (7)
The asymptotic state for a constant value of α(> 0.5)
is a Cantor set fractal distribution. In particular, for
α = 2/3, the final distribution is the middle-third Can-
tor set, generated by successively dividing intervals into
three equal parts and then removing the central section.
Therefore, the wealth possessed by an agent at any given
time form a discontinuous range of values.
For randomly varying α, the asymptotic distribution
of TF model is composed of an infinite number of Cantor
sets generated by the different values of α. This turns out
to be a power law distribution with an exponent ≃ 0.45.
The occurrence of a power-law or scale-free distribution
can be understood as follows. Each of the Cantor set
distributions generated for a fixed α has a length scale
associated with it, corresponding to the fraction of an
interval removed recursively during its generation. For
random α, since all Cantor sets are represented, this im-
plies that all length scales are present in the asymptotic
distribution. This results in a scale-free distribution for
randomly varying α.
To understand why YS and TF models lead to very
different asymptotic distributions, we look at the effect
of a sequence of unfavorable outcomes (i.e., losses) on
the wealth of the richer agent (Fig. 2). Let us suppose
that in both models, the rich agent (A, say) owns a sig-
nificant fraction of the total wealth (x = 0.95, say). If
we now look at the result of a series of losses, we find
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that agent A is much less affected in the YS model than
in the TF model, and the larger the initial wealth of
A, the greater is the difference between the two models.
This means that, if initially one of the agents acquire a
significant fraction of the total wealth (by random fluctu-
ations), then the dynamics of the YS model assures that
the agent will consolidate this position. The greater the
value of wealth acquired by the agent, the larger is the
number of successive unfavorable outcomes needed (and
therefore, more and more unlikely to occur) to shift it
from the status of the richer agent.
This observation is further strengthened by observing
the n-th return maps for each of the two systems (Fig.
3). For the YS model, all the higher iterate maps have
stable fixed points only at x = 0 and x = 1. The TF
model on the other hand have increasing number of stable
fixed points distributed over a wide range as the order of
the return map is increased. This immediately implies
that randomly switching between maps in the TF model
will lead to a fairer distribution of wealth, whereas that
will not be the case in the YS model. Further, for YS
model we find that the attractor where the system will
eventually end up in, is decided by the first few outcomes
of bargaining among the two agents. Once the system
enters the basin of attraction of one of the attractors
(x = 0 or x = 1) through a series of favorable outcomes,
it takes many more unfavorable outcomes for it to come
out and enter the other attractor’s domain. If one of the
agents, by chance, wins the first few successive bargaining
rounds then it is almost bound to be the eventual winner.
This is reminiscent of the phenomena of positive feedback
leading to ‘lock-in’ in real economic systems [12].
B. 3-agent models
The 3-agent TF model (with the total wealth normal-
ized to 1) can be represented in the triangular region
[(0,0), (0,1), (1,0)] in the two-dimensional plane. This
is because we need to only explicitly specify the wealths
x1 (t) and x2 (t) of two agents (A and B, say), the third
agent (C) having wealth 1− x1 (t)− x2 (t).
The 3-agent model is the simplest case where we can
study the effect of different types of interaction coupling
among agents. For example, instead of allowing all the
agents to trade among themselves, we can forbid trade
between agents B and C (say). Therefore, B and C can
only trade with each other through a “go-between” (in
this case, agent A). Our simulations showed no differ-
ences in the results for the two schemes. Fig. 4 (a)
shows the attractors corresponding to the two types of
coupling among agents. The asymptotic distribution is
again a power law, with the exponent value of 0.5±0.005
(Fig. 4 (b)) for both types of network interaction struc-
ture.
C. N-agent models
As the number of agents N is increased, the models
become increasingly difficult to understand in terms of
dynamical systems. However, most of the features of the
2- and 3-agent games carry over to the N -agent case. For
example, the observation that all wealth condenses into
the hands of a single agent, holds true in the N -agent YS
model as N →∞. In the TF model, as N increases, the
asymptotic wealth distribution becomes exponential.
A few special cases can be understood completely even
in the N → ∞ limit. One of these is the case when
α = 1. For the YS model, this corresponds to a “Double-
or-nothing” scenario, where the poorer agent stands to
either double its wealth (if it wins) or lose everything
to the richer agent (if it loses). The richer agent, on
the other hand, stands to lose or gain only an amount of
wealth equal to that owned currently by the poorer agent.
The corresponding situation in the TF model gives the
winner (independent of whether the richer or the poorer
agent wins) all the assets of the loser. Therefore, this
situation corresponds to a “Winner-take-all” scenario. It
can be easily seen that both cases quickly lead to the
concentration of wealth into the hands of a steadily de-
creasing minority.
III. DIMINISHING BARGAINING EFFICIENCY
WITH WEALTH
We have so far assumed that the probability that an
agent will gain net wealth is independent of its wealth.
However, in any real situation, it is unlikely that an agent
who owns 1,000 units of wealth (say) will be as concerned
about winning or losing 1 additional unit, as an agent
who has only 1 unit. Therefore, the relative value of the
amount of wealth won or lost by an agent is clearly a
function of its wealth at that given time. This results
in the increasing aggressiveness of the poorer agent in
getting a favorable deal during any trade with a wealthier
agent.
This is implemented in the asset exchange model by
expressing the probability that agent i will win when
trading with agent j, p(i|i, j), as a ‘Fermi function’:
p(i|i, j) =
1
1 + exp(β[ xi
xj
− 1])
, (8)
with β parametrising the significance of the relative value
of wealth between trading agents. For β = 0, the original
asset exchange model is retrieved, where the probability
that any agent wins a round of trading is 1/2, indepen-
dent of their wealth. When β > 0, the poorer agent has
a higher probability of winning, the difference from the
original probability (= 1/2) depending on the value of β.
In the special circumstance when the two agents have the
same wealth, the probability of each of them winning is
1/2, irrespective of the value of β.
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As β → ∞, it becomes certain that in any encounter
the poorer agent will win. Intuitively it is clear that this
will ensure a fairer distribution of wealth. In fact, when
α is a constant, the corresponding stochastic IFS reduces
to a deterministic map; when N = 2, it is a map of the
unit interval [0,1] onto itself (Fig. 5).
In the YS model, with α = 1 (“Double-or-nothing”
for the poorer agent), the wealth distribution remains in
the condensate phase even as β → ∞. This is because,
although wealth changes hands frequently, the number of
solvent agents who can trade steadily decreases over time.
Wealth gets accumulated into the hands of a steadily
diminishing number of agents, although the label of the
wealthiest agent keeps changing. But for any α < 1,
the wealth distribution will tend to be fairer, i.e., the
asymptotic distribution no longer corresponds to all the
wealth ending up with just one agent. The chaotic map
corresponding to the YS model at β → ∞ (for a fixed
value of α) ensures a more uniform distribution of wealth
among the agents.
When we implement this principle in the 2-agent YS
model with randomly varying α, we immediately find
that varying β completely alters the asymptotic wealth
distribution. At the limit β → ∞ the distribution func-
tion is triangular or ‘tent’-shaped:
P (x) = 4x, if x ≤ 0.5; = 4(1− x), otherwise,
where x is confined to the unit interval. As β is de-
creased, we find that the central peak of the distribution
(at x = 0.5) gradually diminishes, while the tails of the
distribution (at x = 0 and 1) gradually start rising (Fig.
6). The distribution finally becomes identical to the delta
function peak distribution of the conventional YS model
as β → 0.
In the 2-agent TF model (Fig. 5 (right)), if α is fixed,
then at β → ∞, the asymptotic state is a 2-cycle, with
the two players alternately switching between two wealth
values x1, x2 (x1 > 0.5 > x2). The exact numerical value
of x1, x2 depends on α. With randomly varying α we
find a smooth asymptotic distribution which peaks at
the center (x = 0.5). Unlike the TF model, here the
distribution is not piecewise linear. With decreasing β,
the central peak diminishes with corresponding increase
at the tails of the distribution (Fig. 7).
When we implement the principle in the N -agent YS
model, with α fixed to a constant value (= 0.5, say), we
find that a power-law distribution is observed at inter-
mediate values of β. The same result is seen when α
is randomly varied (Fig. 8). For large value of β, the
asymptotic distribution is exponential for large wealth
(Fig. 8 (a)), with an initial power law increase (which
disappears with decreasing β). With increasing β, the
distribution shows an increasing peak at the most prob-
able value of x = 1, i.e., the average wealth per agent. In
other words, as the effect of the relative value of wealth
becomes more pronounced, it becomes more likely that
every agent will have the same amount of money (on
average). As already mentioned, at intermediate values
of β, a power-law distribution is observed (Fig. 8 (b)).
As β is decreased further, a condensation at very high
value of wealth is observed in addition to the power law
distribution. Further decrease of β leads to the increas-
ing condensation of the wealth in the hands of fewer and
fewer agents, until, at β = 0, a single agent acquires all
the wealth (the conventional YS model).
Note that if we implement increasing bargaining effi-
ciency with increasing wealth, we have a situation essen-
tially similar to the ‘greedy exchange’ model investigated
in Ref. [2]. This possibly corresponds to the condition
that the wealthier agent has greater chance of dictating
terms to the poorer agent during any bargaining.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have first discussed random asset ex-
change models as a class of stochastic dynamical systems.
This allows us to understand why different asymptotic
distribution are observed in the YS and TF models. We
can also connect the features observed in these models
with phenomena like positive feedback (‘lock-in’) seen in
real economic situations. We have then introduced the
realistic notion that the ‘value’ of a certain quantity of
wealth is relative to the wealth currently owned by an
agent, i.e., to a very wealthy agent the gain or loss of
a very small quantity is not as important as it is to a
very poor agent. Implementing this principle, we ob-
serve exponential distribution of wealth among agents,
in addition to the condensate phase observed in the orig-
inal YS model. More interestingly, we see a power-law
distribution of wealth in the region of transition between
the exponential and condensate phases.
The use of a Fermi function (Eq. (8)) to express the
probability of an agent to win a particular exchange with
another agent, p(i|i, j), as a function of their relative
wealth, xi/xj, can be interpreted as an implementation
of a principle of diminishing marginal utility of relative
wealth. If the utility U is expressed as a function of
the relative wealth w, then the probability p(i|i, j) is
related to the marginal utility ∂U/∂w. Therefore, the
probability of winning, and hence, the marginal utility
corresponding to an utility function which initially rises
rapidly with w, but for higher values of w shows very
little or no growth, is represented very well by a Fermi
function. In the β → ∞ limit, Eq. (8) implies that the
utility function increases linearly upto some maximum
value U = Umax (when the relative wealth w = 1), and
then stays constant at all higher values of w. On the
other hand, when β = 0, the utility function is a strictly
linear increasing function of the relative wealth.
A possible interesting aspect not fully explored is the
role of the network structure of interaction among the
agents. There has been some study of small-world effects
in wealth distribution through interactive multiplicative
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stochastic process [13]. In the conventional YS model,
the introduction of small-world or regular structure, re-
quiring agents to interact preferentially with some agents,
does not change the eventual delta-function peak distri-
bution of wealth. The only effect of a regular network
structure is that multiple delta-function peaks coexist,
depending upon the allowed range of interaction. We
have not carried out a corresponding study of the model
under the condition of diminishing bargaining efficiency
with wealth.
Another possibly fruitful area of future work is the
connection of the models studied in this paper to mass-
aggregation models allowing diffusion, aggregation and
dissociation [14]. Such models show nonequilibrium
phase transitions, from a state where the steady state
mass distribution decays exponentially to another state
where an infinite aggregate is observed in addition to a
power law distribution. The principal difference with the
models that we study here is that in mass aggregation
all the units exchanged have the same fixed mass value,
whereas here we have no limit to the smallest amount of
wealth an agent can possess and exchange. However, it is
striking that both types of models show similar phases.
I thank Bikas K. Chakrabarti and Maitreesh Ghatak
for helpful discussions. This work was partly inspired by
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FIG. 1. The IFS corresponding to the 2-agent (left) YS
model and (right) TF model with α = 0.5. The system
stochastically switches from one map to the other depend-
ing on which of the two agents (A, B) wins a particular round
of trading.
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FIG. 2. Difference between the 2-agent YS model (broken
lines) and TF model (solid lines) in the effect of a sequence
of unfavorable outcomes on the wealth of the initially richer
agent (A) with α = 0.5. In both models, agent A starts out
with wealth x0 = 0.95. The return maps (left) of the two
models show that the losses affect A more strongly in the TF
model than in the YS model (especially when x is large). The
time evolution of the wealth fraction owned by A, x(t) (right)
indicates that, while in the TF model, it takes only one loss
to change the status of agent A from the richer (x ≥ 0.5) to
the poorer agent (x < 0.5), in the YS model, on the other
hand, it takes six successive losses to change the status of A.
So, in the YS model, if initially one of the agents acquire a
significant fraction of the total wealth, this imbalance will be
consolidated in subsequent trading, as the occurrence of the
number of unfavorable outcomes needed to shift the balance
in favor of the other agent becomes increasingly unlikely with
increasing x.
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FIG. 3. The second return map of the 2-agent (left) YS
model and (right) TF model with α = 0.5. Both the models
have four fixed points, but while all four are stable in the TF
model, only two (x = 0 and x = 1) are stable in the YS model.
Each curve is labelled by a pair of letters ‘XY’, indicating that
it corresponds to the case where a win of agent X in the first
time instant (t + 1), is followed by a win of agent Y in the
next time instant (t+2). Note that, in the YS model, for the
case of both agents winning once (i.e., AB or BA), the basin
of attraction for x = 1 is larger than x = 0 when A wins first,
and the reverse holds true when B wins first. This indicates
the strong dependence of the final state of the system on the
initial states (i.e., the winner of the first few ‘trades’ has a
very high probability of emerging as the eventual winner).
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FIG. 4. (a) The attractors corresponding to the 3-agent TF
model (randomly varying α) for the (left) unrestricted case,
where all agents freely interact with each other, and (right)
the restricted case, where direct interaction between two of
the agents (B and C) is not allowed. (b) The asymptotic
probability distribution of wealth acquired by an agent in the
unrestricted case. The slope of the power-law distribution is
0.5 ± 0.005. The corresponding figure for the restricted case
is identical.
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FIG. 5. The deterministic maps corresponding to the
2-agent (left) YS model and (right) TF model with α = 0.5
and the relative value parameter β → ∞. In the YS model,
the map is chaotic, whereas, for the TF model the map dy-
namics converges to a period-2 cycle.
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FIG. 6. The asymptotic probability distribution of wealth
in the 2-agent YS model with randomly varying α, as the
relative value parameter β is gradually increased from β = 4
to β = 100.
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FIG. 7. The asymptotic probability distribution of wealth
in the 2-agent TF model with randomly varying α as the
relative value parameter β is gradually increased from β = 0.1
to β = 100.
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FIG. 8. The probability distribution of wealth in the YS
model with N = 1000 at time t = 1.5×107 (α randomly vary-
ing) for (a) β = 1 [circles], = 10 [triangles] and = 100 [squares]
(exponentially decaying for large wealth), (b) β = 0.1 [pluses](
slope of the power-law curve is 1.30 ± 0.05) and β = 0.01
[crosses] (slope of the power-law curve is 1.27 ± 0.05). Note
the condensation of wealth at x ∼ 103 for β = 0.01.
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